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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs moved
August 8, 1996.

to amend the original

complaint

on

Assuming that the November 4, 1994 appointment

date of a guardian for Brandon Holton is the operative date for
purposes of the statute of limitations, then the motion to amend
was timely and had it been correctly granted, would have eliminated
a statute of limitations defense.

Therefore, it was an error not

to permit amendment of the complaint.
Defendants assert that a 1987 amendment to Section 78-12-

36 U.C.A. was intended to create a statute of limitations period
for minors

for whom a guardian has been appointed, but

still

maintains a tolling period for Statute of Limitations purposes for
minors, for whom no guardian has been appointed.

This position is

inconsistent with the history of Section 78-12-36 and an incorrect
application of the 1987 amendment.
ARGUMENT
Point I
Plaintiffs moved to amend the original complaint on
August 8/ 1996.
Assuming that the November 4, 1994
appointment date of a guardian for Brandon Holton is the
operative
date
for purposes
of
the
statute of
limitations, then the motion to amend was timely and had
it been correctly granted/ would have eliminated a
statute of limitations defense.
Therefore, it was an
error not to permit amendment of the complaint.
Defendants assert that the statute of limitations expired
on Brandon Holton's claim on November 4, 1996, a date two years
after the appointment of a legal guardian having the power to bring
a wrongful death claim on Brandon's behalf.

Assuming November 4,

1996 is then the operative date for purposes of the statute of
limitations (which is disputed regarding a minor's claim in Point
II of this Reply Brief), then whether or not the original complaint
was incorrectly titled became irrelevant because the defect, had
the motion to amend been granted, would have been cured before the
November 4, 1996 date, at which time the minor boys themselves
2

would have been served with the amended complaint.
The body of the original complaint clearly identified the
boys themselves as the alleged negligent parties.

The allegations

of the complaint were never against the parents of the boys, but
instead, always against the boys themselves.

There was never,

contrary to the assertion in defendant Carstensen's brief, any
claim against the parents, nor any attempt to reach their assets.
Instead the complaint specifically alleged:
9. The boys negligently and carelessly
dislodged a rock weighing 2 0 to 2 5 pounds as
they climbed above the vertical cliff face.
The rock rolled down the mountainside and fell
over the edge of the vertical cliff where it
struck Elizabeth Holton on the head.
The complaint itself was always correctly formed.
the title was wrong.

Only

Therefore, before November 4, 1996, the

strongest position the defendants can assert in this appeal is that
the

complaint

was

titled

incorrectly.

This

is

precisely

a

circumstance which Rule 15 is designed and intended to remedy, and
had the motion to amend been granted, not only would the defect in
the title of the complaint been remedied, but plaintiffs would have
had ample time to serve the boys even before November 4, 1996.
The motion to amend the complaint was made only six weeks
after

the original

filing.

There

3

is no prejudice

which

any

defendant

could show by an amendment

court abused

at that point.

The

trial

its discretion in failing to allow the amendment.

Trimm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178 (Utah 1993); Lewis v. Moultree, 627
P.2d 94, 98 (Utah 1981).
Point II
Defendants assert that a 1987 amendment to Section 78-1236 U.C.A. was intended to create a statute of limitations
period for minors for whom a guardian has been appointed,
but still maintains a tolling period for Statute of
Limitations purposes for minors, for whom no guardian has
been appointed. This position is inconsistent with the
history of Section 78-12-36 and an incorrect application
of the 1987 amendment.
The general law, virtually nationwide, is that a minor's
claims are tolled during the minor's period of his minority.
has long followed this rule of law.

Utah

Indeed, going back to at least

1943, Utah has had a tolling statute for minors, among others.
104-2-37

(Code 1943).

See

It was repealed by Laws 1951(one) , ch. 58

Section 3, but was simultaneously reenacted as Section 78-12-36.
In the 1953 Code

(see appendix 1 ) , the statute read:

If a person entitled to bring an action, other than
for the recovery of real property, is at the time
the cause of action accrued, either:
1) Under the age of majority; or
2) Insane; or
3) Imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in
execution under the sentence of a criminal
court, for a term less than for life;

4

The time of such disability is not a part of the
time limited for the commencement of the action,
(emphasis added)
In
amended.

1975, paragraph

The word

two

(2) of

Section

78-12-36

was

"Insane" was dropped and replaced with the

phrase "(2) Mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian."
The portion of paragraph two "and without a legal guardian" only
modified the words "mentally incompetent."

The words "and without

a legal guardian" never modified paragraph 1 "Under the age of
majority".

In fact, the separate paragraphs of Section 78-12-36

were always in the disjunctive.

A person could be "either" under

the age of majority "or" mentally incompetent and without a legal
guardian.

(See appendix 2)
In 1987, the legislature took paragraph 3 relating to

imprisonment out of the statute and simply dropped the numbering of
paragraphs one (1) and two (2) . The Amendment Notes (see appendix
3) state:
The 1987 amendment deleted the subsection
references in this section as set out in the
bound volume, and deleted "imprisonment on a
criminal charge or in execution under the
sentence of a criminal court for a term less
than for life" following "without a legal
guardian" and made minor changes in phraseolgy
and punctuation throughout the section.
There is no identified intent to create, in the amended

5

statute, a change in its original and historical meaning, or to
modify the intent of the former language contained in subsections
1 and 2.
To read such an intent into the amended statute is to
move Utah away, not only from its own case law, but out of the vast
majority of decisional law across the country.
In the case of Scott v. School Board, 568 P.2d 746 (Utah
1977) , the Utah Supreme Court reviewed a provision of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act which required plaintiffs to give notice
of claim against the State within a certain period of time.

The

minor argued that the notice requirement was tolled by operation of
the general tolling statute.

The Utah Supreme Court agreed, saying

minor claimants are entitled to tolling provisions "in all cases"
because "[t]o hold otherwise is a denial of due process and equal
protection." Id. At 748.
In reaching this decision, the Court observed:
parents, or natural guardians, have no
specific legal duty to perform and have no
responsibility to their minor off-spring other
than their moral obligation. Consequently, in
matters of this kind, when a parent... fails
for one reason or another to give notice, file
suit, or otherwise protect the minor's legal
interests, the minor is left completely
without a remedy. This was undoubtedly one of
the prime considerations which prompted the
legislature to toll the statute during the
minority of a claimant [in the similar notice
provision.]
This holding is exactly in line with the majority rule

6

from across the country regarding minor's claims.
First State Ins. Co., 456 N.W. 2d 152, 155

See Scott v.

(Wis. 1990)

("The

purpose of tolling the statute of limitations when the plaintiff is
a minor is to enure that a minor's rights are not lost because a
parent or guardian neglected to protect the minor by bringing a
timely action."); Cross v. Pacific Gas and Electric, 388 P.2d 353
(Cal.

1964);

Schierenbeck v. Minor, 367 P.2d

333, 334

(Colo.

1961)(state policy to insure minor's rights are not impaired by
failure of courts and attorneys to sufficiently present

their

cause); Severs v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 434 N.E. 2d 290, 292 (111.
1982)(minor litigants entitled to special protection by courts,
especially

to

ensure

that

their

rights

are

protected

from

negligence of their representatives.)
In the case of Switzer v. Reynolds, 606 P.2d 244, 247
(Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court said, concerning wrongful death
claims that "since the cause of action is a personal property right
of the heir, it would be consistent with prior interpretations of
Utah law to hold the limitation period [concerning wrongful death
claims] is tolled during the period of a minor's disability."
To hold that the legislature in the 1987 amendment of
Section 78-12-36 intended to have "without a legal guardian" now
modify

"under

problems.

the

age

of

majority"

raises

several

distinct

First, such a holding is inconsistent with the long

standing history of this statute and the case law in this state and
7

would represent a complete reversal of state policy.

Secondly,

such a holding would raise serious due process and equal protection
concerns.

As

observed

in Scott v.

School

Board, minors

are

entitled to tolling provisions "in all cases" because "[t]o hold
otherwise is a denial of due process and equal protection."
denial

of

due

process

and

equal

protection

would

be

This

further

exacerbated by such a holding regarding the 1987 amendment because
minors who have no legal guardian will still receive the full
benefit

of

the

tolling

statute

while

those who have

a

legal

guardian are held to a shorter statute and penalized because of
negligence on the part of the guardian who has no legal duty to
file any claim on behalf of the minor Scott v. School Board, Id at
748; see also Hamilton by and through Hamilton v. Vaden, 721 P.2d
412

(Okl.

1986)

("the

guardian

has

the

right,

but

not

the

obligation, to sue within the prescribed period of limitation.

The

guardian's failure to bring suit, or the discontinuation of a suit,
within the statutory period does not prejudice the minor's rights."
Id. 416.)
"without

Thirdly, it makes practical and logical sense that
a

legal

guardian"

only

continue

to modify

"mentally

incompetent."
A mentally incompetent person might never overcome their
disability, therefore, the appointment of a guardian insures that
the individual will be able to exercise their rights, despite their
disability.

However, a minor's exercise of rights, such as pursuit
8

of a wrongful death claim, is not permanently impeded under any
circumstance.

The

minor

overcomes

the

disability

within

a

cognizable period of time, i.e. upon reaching the age of majority.
The only ones who may not do so are those who are permanently
incompetent.

Therefore, there is no logical or justifiable reason

to create different categories for minors.
Furthermore, the recent case of Jensen v. IHC Hospitals,
Inc., 314 Utah Adv. Rep. 24 (Utah 1997) is not controlling on the
above issues and should not be mistakenly cited as authority for a
different holding.
In Jensen, Shelly Jensen suffered injuries during the
birth of her minor children which, 3 M years later, lead to her
death.

The statute of limitations on medical claims is two years.

The legal claim for her injuries belonged to her, and in this case,
to her legal guardian, who was appointed for her because she was in
a coma during that time.
A
independent

wrongful

death

claim,

to

the

contrary,

is

"an

action accruing in the heirs of the deceased, Van

Wagoner v. Union Pac. R.R., 186 P.2d 293, 303 (Utah 1947) Jensen
Id. at 27.

However, as pointed out in Jensen, when the wrongful

death claim is based on some underlying wrong done to the decedent,
the wrongful death claim is subject to defenses which could have
been raised against the decedent, i.e. a statute of limitations
defense.

Citing Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, Section
9

127 at 955 (5th Ed. 1984) our Supreme Court recognized that:
"the injured individual is not merely a
conduit for the support of others, he is
master of his own claim and he may settle the
case or win or lose a judgment on his own
injury even though others may be dependent on
him."
... The majority of states refuses to
allow a decedent's heirs to proceed with a
wrongful death suit after the decedent has
settled his or her personal injury case or won
or lost a judgment before dying.
Id. Given
the underlying rationale, and given that the
core purpose of any statute of limitations is
to compel exercise of a right within a
reasonable time to avoid stale claims, loss of
evidence, and faded memories... . we see no
reason to impose a different rule regarding
the heirs' maintenance of a wrongful death
suit where an injured patient has chosen to
let the statute of limitations run on the
underlying personal injury claim rather than
settling or litigating the claim. Jensen, at
27.
In this case, Mrs. Jensen's minor daughter's claims were
not tolled because the claim never belonged to them.

It was a

personal property right of their mother to be enforced on her
behalf by her guardian subject to the medical negligence statute of
limitations applicable to an adult claimant.

Thus, Section 78-12-

36 was not implicated or brought into play in this instance.
argument

"The

[that Section 78-12-36 is applicable] fails because the

children's situation does not fit within the tolling statute's
terms.... Shelly's children were not entitled to bring an action
for wrongful death because Shelly had an appointed guardian at the
time of her death."

Jensen, at 29.

10

Thus, Jensen never reaches the question of what Section
78-12-36 (as amended in 1987) may or may not mean, and cannot be
read as authority for the assertion that
guardian"

now modifies

footnote

5

to

the

"and without a legal

"under the age of majority."
Jensen

decision

specifically

Indeed,
reserved

consideration of the application of Section 78-12-36 to minors
claims

because

in

Jensen

it

was

never

brought

into

play.

Therefore, the law of this State remains the holding in Switzer v.
Reynolds, 606 P.2d 244 (Utah 1980).
Conclusion
Brandon Holton's claim is tolled by Section 78-12-36,
Utah Code Annotated and the trial Court abused its discretion in
failing to allow an amendment of the original complaint.
The case should be remanded to the trial Court with
instructions to reinstate Brandon Holton's wrongful death claim*
Dated this

ff

day of ](&£*H40LsL

, 1997.

MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this

11

/,£—

day of December,

1997,

I mailed

two true and correct

copies of the above and

foregoing Plaintiffs' Reply Brief, postage prepaid, to:
Robert C. Keller
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Joseph J. Joyce
Kevin R. Watkins
STRONG & HANNI
9 Exchange Place, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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APPENDIX

78-lZ-3t>

JUUll/l/tU

KJ\JU£J

Co., 72 XI. 137, 269 P. 147, 59 A. L. E.
1318.

of action was barred by 104-2-22, 1042-23, and 104-2-24, subdivisions 2 and
3, then plaintiff in his reply, as required
by 104-11-1, must s t a t e the conditions
tolling the s t a t u t e prescribed by this
section, and defendant corporation is not
required to prove compliance by it with
requirements of Code 1953, 16-8-1 and 168-3 imposed on foreign corporations. Clawson v. Boston Acme Mines Development

7.

Doctrine in equity.
Absence of defendant from state does
not preclude interposition of defense of
laches to suit for an accounting, even
though statute of limitations has not
barred proceeding. Smith v. Smith, 77 U.
60, 68f 291 P. 298.

78-12-36. Effect of disability.—If a person entitled to bring an action,
other than for the recovery of real property, is at the time the cause of
action accrued, either:
(1) Under the age of majority; or,
(2) Insane; or,
(3) Imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in execution under the sentence of a criminal court, for a term less than for life;—
The time of such disability is not a part of the time limited for the
commencement of the action.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-36.
Compiler's Note.
This section is identical, with the exception of the deletion of phrase " B u t
such action may be commenced within one
year after such disability shall cease"
which was deleted from former section
104-2-37 (Code 1943) which was repealed
by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3.
Comparable Provisions.
Deering's Cal. Civ. Proc. Code, § 3 5 2 ;
Idaho Code 1947, § 5-230 (substantially
identical, except t h a t omitted is the concluding language herein, "but such action
may be commenced * * *"; an added provision is as follows: "4. A married woman,
and her husband be a necessary p a r t y
with her in commencing such action").
Montana Rev. Codes 1947, §93-2703
(similar; time so limited cannot be extended more than five years by any such
disability, except infancy; or, in any case,
more than one year after
disability
ceases).

Collateral References.
Limitation of Actions<§=^70(l).
54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 216.
Personal disabilities, 34 Am. J u r . 155,
Limitation of Actions § 192 et seq.
Appointment of committee for incompetent or guardian for infant as affecting running of statute of limitations
against him, 128 A. L. R. 1379.
One wrongfully adjudged or committed
as insane as within benefit of provision of
statute of limitations allowing time to
sue after removal of disability, 166 A. L.
R. 960.
Proof
of unadjudged
incompetency
which prevents running of statute of limitations, 9 A. L. R. 2d 964.
Statute providing t h a t an insane person,
minor, or other person under disability
may bring suit within specified time after
removal of disability as affecting right
to bring action before disability removed,
109 A. L. R. 954.
Tacking disabilities for purposes of the
statute, 53 A. L. R. 1303.

Cross-Reference.
Disaffirmance of contract by minor, 152-2.
DECISION U N D E R FORMER LAW
1.

Applicability of section.
This section had no application in
action against town which was barred

because of failure to file claim. Hurlev
v. Town of Bingham, 63 U. 589, 228 P.
213.

78-12-37. Effect of death.—If a person entitled to bring an action dies
before the expiration of the time limited for the commencement thereof,
and the cause of action survives, an action may be commenced by his
representatives after the expiration of that time and within one year
154

78-12-36

JUDICIAL CODE

of limitations as to judgment, 27 A L R
2d 839
Acknowledgment or payment effective to
toll statute against corporation on obhga
tion upon which it is bound as a co ob
hgor with a corporate officer as supporting
an inference of acknowledgment which
will toll statute as against latter, or vice
versa, 144 A L R 1015
Nonresidence or absence of defendant
from state as suspending or tolling stat
ute of limitations, where relief is sought,
or could have been sought, by an action
or proceeding in rem or quasi in rem,
119 4 L R 331
Provision in s t a t u t e of limitations as to
absence from state as applied to a non
resident individual who has an office or
place of business m the state, 61 A L R
391
Provision of statute excluding period of
defendant's absence from the state as ap
plicable to a local cause of action against
individual who was a nonresident when the
same arose, 17 A L R 2d 502
Provision of s t a t u t e of limitation ex
eluding period of absence of debtor or
defendant from state as applicable to ac
tion on liability or cause of action ac
crumg out of state, 148 A L R 732

Provision suspending limitations while
defendant is a nonresident or without the
state as affected by nonresidence of party
asserting cause of action, 83 A L R 271
Right to enter judgment by confession
as affecting suspension of statute of hmi
tations during absence of debtor from
state, 172 A L R 997
Statutory provision denying or limiting
right of nonresident, or of resident absent
from state, to benefit of statute of limitations, as affected by fact that he was
subject to service of process during ab
sence or nonresidence, 119 A L R 859
Tolling of statute of limitations during
absence from state as affected by fact
that party claiming benefit of limitations
remained subject to service during ab
sence or nonresidence 55 A L R 3d 1158
V a h d i t v and construction of war enact
ment in United States suspending o p e n
tion of statute of limitations 137 A L E
1440, 140 \ L R 1518 145 A L R 1473
War as suspending running of limita
tions in absence ot specific statutory pro
\ision to that effect 137 A L R 1454,
140 A L R 1518, 141 A L R 1511, 145
A L R 1473

78-12-36 Effect of disability—If a person entitled to bring an action,
other than for the recovery of real property is at the time the cause
of action accrued, either
(1) Under the age of majority, or,
(2) Mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian, or,
(3) Imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in execution under the sentence of a criminal court, for a term less than for life,—
The time of such disabilit} is not a part of the time limited for the
commencement of the action
History L 1951, ch 58, § 1 , C 1943,
Supp, 104-12 36, I*. 1975, ch 67, § 16
Compiler's Notes
This section is similar to former section
104 2 37 (Code 1943) which was repealed
by Laws 1951 ch 58 § 3 except tor the
deletion of the concluding phrase "But
such action may be commenced within one
year after such disability shall cease "
The 1975 amendment substituted "Men
tally incompetent and without a legal
guardian" in subd (2) for "Insane "
Cross References
Actions to recover real property, effect
of disability, 78 12 21
Age of majontv, 15 2 1
Disaffirmance of contract by minor, 15
2 2, 15 2 3

Product LiabihU \ c t , limitations pro
\isions applicable regardless of disability,
78 15 3
Nonresident motorists
Nonresident motonsts were not absent
from the state so as to toll running of
statute of h m i t i t i o n s although they left
state immediately after automobile col
hsion and remained without state, as they
had an agent in person of secretary of
state upon whom process could have been
served under 41 12 8 Snvder v Clune, 15
U (2d) 254, 390 P 2d 915
Notice of claim requirements
This section had no application to ac
tion against town which was barred be
cause of failuie to file claim Hurley v
Town of Bingham, 63 U 589, 228 P 213,
construing former statute

238

78-12-36

JUDICIAL CODE

—Defendant's family.
The full time that the debtor is out of the
state must be excluded in computing the time,
notwithstanding fact that debtor's family may
have residence or place of abode in state and
t h a t seYv\cfc of process could be made vipotv
some member of debtor's family at its residence

or place of abode Keith-O'Brien Co v Snyder,
51 Utah 227, 169 P 954 (1917)
—Statute tolled.
Maintenance of residence within state with
persons living therein did not prevent tolling of
statute of limitations BueYl v Duchesne Mercantile Co , 64 Utah 391, 231 P 123 (1924)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reasonable Assurance of Actual Notice Required for
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah Graham v Sawaya, 1981 B Y U L Rev 937, 945
Am. J U T . 2d. — 51 Am J u r 2d Limitation
of Actions § 154 et seq
C.J.S. — 54 C J S Limitations of Actions
§ 211

A.L.R. — Tolling of statute of limitations
during absence from state as affected by fact
that party claiming benefit of limitations remained subject to service during absence or
nonresidence, 55 A L R 3d 1158
Key Numbers. — Limitation of Actions *=»
84, 85

78-12-36. Effect of disability.
If a person entitled to bring an action, other than for the recovery of real
property, is at the time the cause of action accrued, either under the age of
majority or mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian, the time of
the disability is not a part of the time limited for the commencement of the
action
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C 1943,
Supp., 104-12-36; L. 1975, ch. 67, § 16, 1987,
ch. 19, § 5.
A m e n d m e n t Notes — The 1987 amend
ment deleted the subsection references in this
section as set out in the bound volume and
deleted "imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in
execution under the sentence of a criminal
court, for a term less than for life" following
"without a legal guardian" and made minor
changes in phraseology and punctuation
throughout the section
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1987, ch 19 § 6
provides that the amendment to this section
applies only to causes of action that arise after

April 27 1987 and has no retroactive application
Cross-References. — Actions to recover
real property, effect of disability § 78-12-21
Age of majority § 15-2-1
Disaffirmance
of contract by
minor,
§§ 15-2-2, 15-2-3
Guardians
of
incapacitated
persons,
§ 75-5 301 et seq
Medical malpractice actions limitations provisions applicable regardless of disability,
§ 78-14-4
Product Liability Act, limitations provisions
applicable regardless of disability, § 78-15-3

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Notice of claim requirements
—Failure to file
Action barred
Action not barred
Paternity action
—Mmor\ty
Wrongful death
—Minority
Cited
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